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In the 25 years following the Second World 
War, state governments doubled the amount 
of inﬂ ation adjusted revenue that they 
collected in taxes. Th at represented a growth 
rate more than double that of the federal 
government (see Maxwell 1972). On average, 
the increase in state tax eﬀ ort ﬂ attened out 
markedly by the 1980s, but there has been 
tremendous variation in the degree to which 
individual states have raised or lowered the 
tax burden on citizens over the last four 
decades. Th is study argues that federalism, 
and particularly the grant-in-aid system, 
inﬂ uenced state budgetary decision-making 
and ultimately tax levels within recipient 
jurisdictions over the past 40 years.
Previous Literature on State 
Taxation
Th ere has been considerable interest in the 
correlates of taxation in the American states 
among political scientists. Th is work has 
investigated the role of partisanship and 
generally concluded that Democrats claim 
a larger share of income for government 
revenue than do Republicans, particularly 
under conditions of uniﬁ ed government (Alt 
and Lowery 2000). Research also suggests 
that liberal state governments are more likely 
to adopt new taxes and maintain higher 
levels of tax eﬀ ort (Berry and Berry 1992; 
Camobreco 1998). Finally, authors have 
oﬀ ered an electoral explanation for taxation, 
arguing that  political actors are less likely to 
raise taxes during an election year (Miksell 
1978;  Berry and Berry 1992). 
Fiscal Federalism and State Tax 
Eﬀ ort
Despite the relative breadth of the political 
explanations oﬀ ered for state taxation 
decisions, studies of state-level tax eﬀ ort 
have not suﬃ  ciently explored the potential 
impact of ﬁ scal federalism.1   Th is omission 
is surprising because grants from the federal 
government comprise a meaningful share 
of total state revenue and scholars have 
demonstrated that the strings attached to 
these monies have a signiﬁ cant impact on 
state budgetary decision making. 
Th e causal mechanism for the impact of 
grants-in-aid on state tax eﬀ ort relates to the 
much debated “ﬂ ypaper eﬀ ect,” or the degree 
to which state money “sticks” to federal (see 
Hines and Th aler 1995 for a review). Most 
studies ﬁ nd evidence that grants increase 
state spending, but the stimulative eﬀ ect is 
typically well below a 1 to 1 ratio, suggesting 
that some federal money is used to supplant, 
rather than supplement state money (See 
Gramlich and Galper 1973; Olmstead, 
Denzau, Roberts 1993).  
Th e part of the ﬂ ypaper debate that is relevant 
to this project is not whether or not some 
state money sticks to federal, but rather what 
states do with the portion of own source 
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1 Alt and Lowery (2000) include a measure of federal grants in their model. However, because their dependent variable is total, rather than state generated revenue, the 
  measure  cannot reveal anything about the inﬂ uence of grant monies on lawmakers’ decisions regarding how much of a state’s wealth to extract for government revenue.
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revenue that they supplant with federal grants. Authors have 
approached the question from a variety of theoretical vantage 
points and, generally speaking, they agree that some portion 
of grant monies will be spent on the policies targeted by the 
grantor, while the remainder will be returned to jurisdictional 
citizens in the form of lower taxes. Th e amount of federal 
money that states are able to use to lower their own taxes 
appears to vary dramatically (between approximately 1% and 
60%) depending on the restrictions imposed by Congress, 
the vigor with which they enforce those restrictions, and the 
predisposition of state governments receiving federal monies 
(Bradford and Oates 1971; Chubb 1985; Nicholson-Crotty 
2004). 
Analysis
Th e purpose of this paper is to determine the degree to which 
grants-in-aid exert downward pressure on state tax eﬀ ort, as 
well as the inﬂ uence matching requirements, Congressional 
monitoring, and the policy preferences of the states on this 
relationship. Speciﬁ cally, it examines the impact of federal 
funding for the Medicaid program on tax eﬀ ort in the 
American states between 1971 and 1996.
Tax eﬀ ort is a general measure of the tax burden faced by 
the citizens of a state. Created by the Advisory Council 
on Intergovernmental Relations and updated by various 
scholars, it is the ratio of a state’s tax collection to its absolute 
tax capacity.2  It represents the most accurate measure of the 
degree to which a state government is willing to claim state 
wealth as government revenue.
Medicaid funding is a natural place to look for the relationship 
between grants and tax eﬀ ort for a variety of reasons.3  Th e 
program has been in existence since 1965 and is the nation’s 
largest public health insurance program, providing health and 
long-term care coverage to 52 million low-income people in 
2004 (Kaiser 2004). It is also one of the largest domestic 
federal grant programs (Ku 2006), with expenditures totaling 
more than 205 billion dollars in 2007. Medicaid is a jointly 
funded program whereby states are required to match federal 
funds at a rate between 50 and 77% depending on the state. 
It is a program with relatively liberal redistributive goals 
and, as such, has engendered signiﬁ cant opposition among 
political conservatives. And ﬁ nally, the controversial nature 
of the program and the tremendous sums of money being 
distributed to state governments has ensured signiﬁ cant 
congressional monitoring throughout Medicaid’s existence.
Findings.4  Th e results from this analysis suggest that Medicaid 
disbursements exert signiﬁ cant downward pressure on state 
taxes. In both liberal and conservative states, the impact of 
Medicaid funding on tax eﬀ ort is negative (see Figure 1). 
In states like Ohio or Georgia that were consistently and 
signiﬁ cantly (1 standard deviation) more conservative that 
the average state, the eﬀ ect was particularly large. Between 
1971 and 1996 those states appear to have used 35% more 
Medicaid money to reduce taxes than did consistently liberal 
states such as Massachusetts or Oregon (data not shown). 
Figure : The Impact of Medicaid Funding on Tax 
Effort in States with High and Low 
Levels of Ideological Liberalism
Exploring the impact of Congressional hearings reveals 
a similar pattern (see Figure 2). Regardless of the level of 
oversight, states that receive more Medicaid grant monies 
have lower tax eﬀ ort. Interestingly, however, the ﬁ ndings 
also suggest that the number of Congressional hearings does 
not meaningfully moderate that relationship. Th ough the 
interaction is statistically signiﬁ cant, there appears to be no 
substantive diﬀ erence in eﬀ ect between years when Congress 
held one hearing and years when it held 20.
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2  Capacity is measured as the amount of revenue that a state would collect if it taxed at a standard rate across 21 diﬀ erent types of taxes and abolished all breaks, 
    exemptions, and loopholes. Th ose interested in a more complete description of capacity and Representative Tax System (RTS) approach used to measure it should see ACIR
   (1982) or Tannenwald (1999).
3  Authors have suggested that the relationship between grants and tax eﬀ ort may be reciprocal. Th erefore, the actual measure of Medicaid funding used in the models reported 
    on here is purged of the inﬂ uence of current and past tax eﬀ ort in a state.
4 Th ese ﬁ ndings are from a cross-sectional time series analysis of tax eﬀ ort in all ﬁ fty states between 1971 and 1996. Th e model reports panels corrected standard errors and
   includes controls for a host of alternative inﬂ uences on tax eﬀ ort. Th ese include uniﬁ ed control of state institutions, state wealth, ﬁ scal centralization, taxing and spending
   limits, age and diversity of the population.
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Figure : The Impact of Medicaid Funding on Tax 
Effort In Periods of High and Low Congressional 
Oversight
While interesting in their own right, these fi ndings are 
perhaps less important from a policy perspective if the 
observed effect of grants is being driven primarily by 
cross-sectional variation. In other words, it is important 
to determine if the fi ndings are due to different states 
spending grant funding differently or if, in fact, changes in 
funding in an individual state over time could cause it to 
adjust tax policies, all other things being equal. 
Fixing the effects of cross-sectional variation by including 
a dummy variable in the model for each year allows the 
coeffi cients to be interpreted as the temporal impact of a 
change in Medicaid funding. The fi ndings indicate that 
grant receipts do have a signifi cant and negative effect on 
tax effort within a given state over time. Substantively, 
they suggest that after controlling for ideology and 
Congressional oversight, a state that receives a 15% 
increase in Medicaid funding reduced tax effort in the 
following year by 3%. 
Of course, states do not typically experience such radical 
annual shifts, either positive or negative, in grant aid. 
They do, however, often receive smaller adjustments in 
the same direction year after year. Take, for example, 
Arkansas between the years 1987 and 1996, when the 
measure of purged Medicaid funds per capita increased 
every year, ultimately resulting in a 14% increase in 
infl ation adjusted dollars. Thus, grants-in-aid could 
plausibly have a substantial effect on tax effort in those 
instances where the effect cumulates year after year, and 
all 50 states experienced at least one multi-year period of 
consistent increases or decreases in Medicaid funding per 
capita between 1971 and 1996.
Conclusion
The fi ndings have potentially signifi cant implications in 
the current era of devolution. The proponents of increased 
discretionary authority for state governments often claim 
that the federal government’s attempt to produce more 
public goods through grants-in-aid have increased that 
production, and consequently taxes, to a level that exceeds 
the preferences of many citizens. The results herein 
suggest, however, that rather than pushing tax effort higher 
in the states, grants-in-aid may actually be a mechanism 
whereby state governments can lower the tax burden on 
citizens while still providing needed services. 
These fi ndings also suggest that citizens in high grant states 
are potentially enjoying policy benefi ts at the expense of 
those in states that receive less federal funding. This poses 
important questions about the unintentional (or perhaps 
intentional) geographic redistribution of wealth within the 
U.S. federal system.
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